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Abstract
Filing a false police report is a crime that has dire consequences on both the indi-
vidual and the system. In fact, it may be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony.
For the society, a false report results in the loss of police resources and contamina-
tion of police databases used to carry out investigations and assessing the risk of
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crime in a territory. In this research, we present VeriPol, a model for the detection
of false robbery reports based solely on their text. This tool, developed in collab-
oration with the Spanish National Police, combines Natural Language Processing
and Machine Learning methods in a decision support system that provides police
officers the probability that a given report is false. VeriPol has been tested on more
than 1,000 reports from 2015 provided by the Spanish National Police. Empirical
results show that it is extremely effective in discriminating between false and true
reports with a success rate of more than 91%, improving by more than 15% the
accuracy of expert police officers on the same dataset. The underlying classifica-
tion model can be analysed to extract patterns and insights showing how people
lie to the police (as well as how to get away with false reporting). In general, the
more details provided in the report, the more likely it is to be honest. Finally, a
pilot study carried out in June 2017 has demonstrated the usefulness of VeriPol on
the field.
Keywords: Lie Detection, Information Extraction, Predictive Policing, Model
Knowledge Extraction, Natural Language Processing, Decision Support Systems
1. Introduction
A false report is a crime governed by federal and state laws. It involves a per-
son who -with the intent to deceive- makes a false statement to a police or law
enforcement officer, influencing the outcome of a criminal investigation. Filing a
false police report can have very serious consequences on both the individual and
the system. Depending on the country, it may be considered as a misdemeanor or
a felony, charges which could result in jail terms and/or fines. Besides, in the case
of robberies, it has been observed that a false police report is generally followed
by other crimes, such as frauds, which result in even more serious charges. For
society, a false report represents a waste of public resources that should be dedi-
cated to pursuing other crimes. Also, each undetected false report contaminates
police databases used to carry out investigations as well as assessing the risk of
crime in a territory, which is then used to take strategic decisions, at both local
and national level. Despite its seriousness, this type of crime is extremely com-
mon and it is generally carried out by citizens that do not have a previous criminal
record. Figure 1(a) shows the number of false robbery reports in Spain in 2015,
by urban area. These numbers represent a lower bound to the real number of false
reports as it is impossible to know with certainty their exact number. In fact, our
data shows that more than 80% of the robbery cases are left unsolved. Figure 1(b)
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(a) Number of false robbery reports in Spain in 2015, by
urban area. (For interpretation of the references to color in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
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(b) Percentage of robbery reports identified as false in Spain
in 2015, by urban area. (For interpretation of the references
to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
illustrates the percentage of robbery reports identified as false in Spain in 2015,
by urban area. As it can be seen, the efficacy in detecting false robbery reports is
extremely heterogeneous, ranging from 0% to 20%. Based on the performance of
the most successful Police Department in detecting false robbery reports in 2015,
a rough estimation of the ratio of falsehood is 57% approx.
Is it possible to differentiate between true and false robbery reports based ex-
clusively on the wording of the report? This was the question put to us by the
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representatives of the Spanish National Police (SNP). They also argued that a tool
with such capabilities would represent a revolution for police work, an advance-
ment in terms of methodology, and a change of paradigm in the way that the police
investigates. According to them, this system would help the police to better focus
their resources and, when properly publicized, its mere existence would discour-
age citizens from filing a false report, thus preventing the commission of crimes.
A win-win situation!
We tackled this problem within the framework of Data Science. The method-
ology used is a combination of Natural Language Processing (NLP)[26] algo-
rithms, feature selection methods and Machine Learning (ML)[29] classification
algorithms. The result is VeriPol, a model embedded in a decision support system
capable of analyzing automatically the text of a robbery report and estimating its
probability of falsehood with a high precision, empirically measured to be greater
than 91%. VeriPol perfectly integrates with SIDENPOL, the Spanish National Po-
lice report information system. One of the most interesting features of this tool
is the possibility to analyze its structure to extract knowledge and identify the
most relevant differences between true and false robbery reports. This allows us
to understand how people lie to the police, as well as how a true report looks like.
In short, we could use VeriPol to learn how people lie to the police. Finally, it
should be noted that it is the first tool of this type and represents a real novelty
at both police and academic level. In fact, the research in lie detection on text
is taking its first steps and VeriPol is the first model that has been estimated and
validated on real documents, unlike current contributions in the literature using
fictitious texts, written specifically for research [40, 19]. Having a lie detection
model that is able to automatically predict the truthfulness of a report is a key as-
pect in the usability and applicability of the tool in comparison to other predictive
policing methods that need to be manually fed with key features in order to make
a prediction [7, 56].
In summary, we are dealing with a task of detection and classification of texts
that use verbal deception. This field, although currently a hot topic [11, 1, 5],
is quite new which makes it difficult to compare our contributions against others
concerned with the detection of false or deceptive texts [40, 19, 21, 59]. These
works, that are mostly centered on the domain of spam detection and fake reviews
[43, 32, 22, 47], make use of traditional ML techniques such as Naive Bayes,
Support Vector Machine (SVM), logistic regression or decision trees [8, 25]. A
comparison with several datasets on different domains from the literature shows
that VeriPol outperforms all the considered previous models.
Consequently, this work has the following main contributions:
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• Proposes a novel model for lie detection in written text that incorporates
heuristic and optimal feature selection criteria and outperforms previous
models from the literature.
• Introduces VeriPol, an innovative tool in the predictive policing domain that
automatically extracts attributes fed to the predictive model against manu-
ally fed artificial tools in the same domain [7, 56].
• Presents a case study on real documents (instead of on an artificial ad-hoc
corpus as in other lie detection contributions [40, 19]) in the novel applica-
tion context of false report detection. The case study includes a pilot study
that shows the capabilities of the proposed methodology on the field.
• Illustrates the hidden patterns and characteristics, obtained by a model-
driven analysis of VeriPol, that can be used to differentiate between true
and false robbery reports.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
present the state of the art on predictive policing and detection of deceptive texts.
In Section 3 the design of our lie detection model is illustrated in detail. Next,
Section 4 presents computational experiments that show VeriPol’s performance on
a real dataset, its improvement against state-of-the-art models, a comparison with
human experts evaluations, and the resulting trained model. Next, in Section 5,
the model is analyzed to extract patterns of falsehood and truthfulness in robbery
reports. Section 6 shows the impact of VeriPol in the Spanish National Police by
means of an on-the-field pilot study that took place in 10 Police Departments in
June 2017. The article concludes with a summary of the main findings and some
possible future lines of research.
2. Related Work
In this section, a revision of the state-of-the-art on predictive policing models
is presented along with the relevant literature on detection of false or deceptive
statements.
2.1. State of the art on predictive policing
Up to date, in the specific domain of this research (i.e., false reporting or false
confessions in policing) there is a limited number of studies dealing with the sub-
ject. Among the few existing, Gudjonsson et al. [17] statistically analyzed case
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characteristics of false confessions during interrogation. Also in this line, but on
a much delicate subject, Lisak et al. [35] studied the actual low percentage of
false allegations of sexual assault as well as their characteristics. Ofshe and Leo
[41] provided an analysis of USA’s police interrogation techniques that relates
their traits to the resulting type of confession (i.e., guilty or not). In Kane [31] a
chi-square automatic interaction detector combined with logistic regression mod-
els was used to predict the probability of being arrested. Also, insights such as
possible police biases identified by detected patterns are presented.
Regarding research in crime forecasting, a review on predictive policing prac-
tices can be found in [45] and [15]. It is important to note that, although the
implications of crime forecasting are straightforward, the degree in which predic-
tive policing actually prevents crime is still an open debate [28]. In [45], authors
claim that currently there are four different types of predictive methods:
• Methods for predicting felonies: used to forecast places and times with
crime escalation.
• Methods for predicting transgressors: used to identify individuals at risk of
committing a felony in the future.
• Methods for predicting transgressors identities: used to shape profiles that
precisely match likely transgressors with specific past felonies.
• Methods for predicting victims of felonies: used to identify groups, proto-
types, or in some cases, individuals who are likely to become victims of a
felony.
The research object presented in this paper does not fit in any of these categories.
Therefore, it is necessary to define a new type of predictive method, namely:
“Methods for predicting the veracity of felony victims statements.” To the best
of the authors’ knowledge, VeriPol is the first contribution to this novel line of
applications.
Within the framework of police operations support systems - yet in operational
contexts different from VeriPol, such as patrolling [6, 34] - there are several works
that support tactical deployment of police resources through modeling. For ex-
ample, Cohen et al. [7] created forecasting models of simple linear regressions
and neural networks that predict with an accuracy of R2 = [0.690.79] whether
a crime is violent or not based on a fixed set of 14 dependent variables chosen
based on police requirements and data limitations. Furthermore, Yu et al. [56]
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presented an approach that consists of manually architecting datasets from orig-
inal crime records and using data mining classification techniques [2] to predict
crime “hotspots.”
Reviewed predictive policing literature [6, 7, 56] relied on the manual intro-
duction of data to train their models. Against it, VeriPol extracts prediction factors
directly from the text of a report. Thus, the provided tool can be in fact used, in-
stalled and automatically recalibrated without human effort. It is important to
notice that introducing data manually to feed a model is not a task that police of-
ficers would do, differently from an academic research setting. Therefore, having
a lie detection model that is able to automatically predict the truthfulness of a re-
port is a key aspect in the usability and applicability of the tool in comparison to
other predictive policing methods that need to be manually fed with key features
to make a prediction.
2.2. State of the art on deceptive texts
On a broader scope, within the framework of lie detection, failed attempts
were made to introduce scans of brain activity for use in the courtroom as proof
of lying [37]. However, very little work has been carried out on the automatic and
non-invasive detection of deceptive language in written text. Most of the previous
work has focused on the psychological or social aspects of lying [52, 10]. In
the field of NLP, the number of contributions concerned with the detection of
false or deceiving texts is, again, very limited [40, 19, 59, 48, 21]. One of the
first researches on the subject is the work of Zhou et al. [58], who analyzed
linguistic cues for deception detection in the context of text-based asynchronous
computer mediated communication. More recently, Mihalcea and Strapparava
[36] presented initial experiments in the recognition of deceptive language based
on three self-generated datasets that automatically classify texts as true or false
with a 70% accuracy. Authors concluded that differentiating between truthful
and lying texts is possible, as these classes present characteristics that make them
separable.
Detecting automatically verbal deception [11], in court [12], in reviews [47, 5,
23] or in political debates [1] is a very hot topic in the research community. Most
contributions in this line are mainly concerned with the domain of spam detection
and fake reviews [43, 32, 22]. These works relate to this paper’s topic as they
reflect fictitious opinions that have been intentionally written to sound trustwor-
thy. They mostly follow traditional ML techniques such as Naive Bayes, Support
Vector Machine (SVM), logistic regression or decision trees [8, 25]. Precision
of the aforementioned research works is mostly comprised around the range of
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70-90%. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, to date the best designed tech-
nique in a similar domain is by Ott et al. [43] that accurately classify 89.8%
deceptive hotel reviews by using a combination of bigrams, a psycholinguistic de-
ception detection tool LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software [44])
and a SVM classifier. However, this papers’ methodology exceeds current accu-
racy results regarding the automatic detection of verbal deception, as illustrated
in Section 4.1, both in the same domain as Ott et al. [43] , and in other domains
[36, 42, 33, 5, 24, 22]. Despite of the domain difference (i.e., false reports VS
fake reviews) and the nature of the document (i.e., facts collected and written by a
policeman after questioning the victim of a felony VS a first person written text),
the insights drawn by analyzing the structure of the estimated probability model
seem to lead to common patterns also identified by other researchers in the fake
reviews domain. [19, 40, 43, 55].
All in all, research on lie detection models is still at its infancy. More impor-
tantly there is no previous study on systems that are able to identify false police
reports, neither on tools that make a prediction of the falsehood of a document by
automatically analyzing its text.
3. Methodology
3.1. Context and Data
VeriPol, our lie detection model, is trained using a corpus comprised of 1,122
robbery reports filed in Spain in 2015. Each report represents a document in our
corpus. The corpus includes 534 true reports and 588 false reports. All the reports
have been anonymized by removing any personal information. Also, the reports
only include the text of the declaration of the complainant, without any further
information (e.g., location, date, time, other witnesses or agents reports). The
procedure for the selection of the corpus is described in the following paragraph.
An officer with extensive experience in interrogation, lie detection, and in-
vestigation has been involved in the process of reviewing and classifying all the
reports. This operation ensures the accuracy of the labeling process. In fact,
thanks to this step, many reports whose classification was uncertain have been
disregarded. Reviewing a report is a highly time consuming operation that re-
quires a lot of experience and training. Therefore, the involvement of an expert in
this phase is of primary importance and utterly necessary for the generation of a
feasible corpus. The officer worked on this process over a two year period, after
which the labeling process came to a halt. Reports were presented to the officer in
a random order, alternating potentially true and false reports. As a consequence,
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the sample is almost balanced. This was done because the real ratio of false report
cannot be known, therefore the dataset was built in such a way that both classes are
equally represented. Based on official statistics, only 3.98% of Spanish robbery
reports registered in 2015 were proved to be false. Considering that 81.25% of the
registered robbery cases have not been closed, the real percentage of false robbery
reports could be much higher. In fact, the most successful Police Department in
clearing false robbery reports in 2015 (154 proven false reports), experienced a
ratio of false robbery reports of 57.68% in 2015. Assuming that the distribution
of false reports is homogeneous across the country, this figure highlights that there
is a lot of room for improvement.
3.2. Model Design
Our objective is to estimate the probability of falsehood of a given document.
We propose a model based on NLP preprocessing and ML techniques for proba-
bility estimation. The procedure proposed, consists of several steps explained in
detail in the following.
Step 1: Text Preprocessing. In this first step the corpus is normalized by follow-
ing a NLP preprocessing pipeline [30]: lowercasing, tokenization, lemmatization
and stopword removal. The software TreeTagger [50] was used for tokenization
and lemmatization. While tokenization and stopword removal are standard prior
steps for normalizing texts, lowercasing and lemmatization are aimed at reducing
sparsity and vocabulary size, steps which have been proved beneficial in text clas-
sification tasks [39, 53, 20, 54]. As far as the stopword removal step is concerned,
not only function words (e.g., articles and conjunctions) are removed, but also a
tailored list of words for this specific task has been included to avoid certain biases
into our model. Recent works have shown the need of reducing bias on supervised
models, as the data they are trained on may contain undesirable biases [3, 49, 57].
In our particular case province and autonomous region names are filtered. The
rationale is that the data showed that the ratio of false robbery reports detection
was not homogeneous across Spain. However, according to experts, this is not
due to differences in the behavior of the citizens, but rather on the skill of agents
in detecting false reports or on the priority assigned in the Police Departments to
the investigation of this type of crime.
Step 2: Feature Generation. Unigram lemma frequencies are used as features.
Additionally, the number of tokens, lemmata (total and unique) and sentences
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within a document are also considered. Finally, we count the number of fine-
grained Part-of-Speech (PoS) tags1 per document and add them as features2 See
Table A.16 for the full list of PoS tags and their description. To obtain other
measures that assess different magnitudes, beside frequencies, these features are
further transformed using the following functions:
• Binary transformation, bin(x): given feature x, bin(x) takes value 0 if
x = 0, 1 otherwise. This transformation measures the effect of the fea-
ture appearing in the document.
• Logarithm transformation, log(x): natural logarithm of feature x. This
transformation measures the effect of different orders of magnitude in the
value of the features.
• Ratio transformation, rat(x): all features are divided by the length of the
document, except the unigram features that are divided by their total number
of occurrences. This transformation measures the effect of proportions with
respect to the total.
Therefore, each document i is represented by vector xi, including all the
features and the transformations explained above. This vector is composed of
4 · Nu + 4 · 79 dimensions, where Nu is the number of unigrams after the pre-
processing and 79 represents the number of PoS tags plus the number of tokens,
lemmata (total and unique) and sentences in the document.
Step 3: Feature Selection. To-date research in text classification has widely ig-
nored feature selection techniques in their approaches [8], even when using text
features, which tend to produce hugely dimensional feature sets. Mukherjee et al.
[38] is a marked exception, as authors use Information Gain to perform feature
selection of top 1 and 2%. Despite the low effect on the classifier performance,
based on other domains’ results, feature selection techniques can conceivably im-
prove performance. However, this step should be crucial considering that one of
the major difficulties in text classification task are data sparsity and high dimen-
sionality of the feature space [14].
The unigram feature extraction procedure presented in Steps 1 and 2 produces
a large number of variables. Among them, there could be unigram tokens with
1PoS tagging is also performed by TreeTagger.
2The terms “feature” and “variable” are used interchangeably throughout this text.
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a low appearance rate that are present exclusively (or almost exclusively) in one
class of document. These tokens, though very useful to classify, are not general-
izable as they may only represent a small fraction of the documents, which in turn
leads to overfitting and biased insights. To prevent this, a multi-step feature se-
lection methodology is proposed, comprised of heuristic filters and optimization
procedures, to exclude noisy or not general features.
First, all unigram features that comply with one of the following conditions
are disregarded:
• Low in-sample appearance rate, i.e., less than or equal to 1% of the sample
size.
• Very high appearance rate (i.e., greater than or equal to 99% of the sam-
ple size) but low variability, i.e., the coefficient of variation is less than or
equal to the coefficient of variation of a sequence of numbers showing the
minimum level of variability required. This sequence is built as a sample
of numbers having the same length of the corpus and comprised exactly of:
1% of zeros, 0.5% of ones, 99% of twos, and 0.5% of threes, to represent a
variable that shows very low variability in most of the sample.
Note that when a unigram is disregarded, the corresponding transformations (Bi-
nary, Logarithm and Ratio, see Step 2) are ignored too.
Second, a LASSO model with binomial link function is run on all the remain-
ing variables (unigrams and document variables, and their transformations, see
Step 2). LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) [51] is a re-
gression analysis method that performs variable selection and, to a lesser extent,
regularization to enhance the prediction accuracy and interpretability of the statis-
tical model it produces. Lasso is able to achieve both of these goals by penalizing
the sum of the absolute value of the regression coefficients in the optimization goal
of the logistic model, which forces certain coefficients to be set to zero, effectively
choosing a simpler model that does not include those coefficients. Depending
on the value of the penalization coefficient different models can be obtained. In
this procedure, 100 different penalization values are considered, according to the
methodology presented by Friedman et al. [13]. The variables having non-zero
regression coefficients in the most accurate model are selected while the others
are disregarded.
A couple of improvements are still possible. In case of perfectly correlated
variables, LASSO considers only one among them, arbitrarily. Therefore, it is
possible that a more interpretable version of the chosen variable could have been
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selected instead. In general, the preference order is the following: binary > fre-
quency > logarithm > ratio. To simplify interpretation, after the LASSO pro-
cedure, all the selected variables are checked to see if a preferred version of the
variable is perfectly correlated with the incumbent one. In this case, the incum-
bent variable is substituted with the most interpretable available. Note that this
does not have an impact on the subsequent classification.
Finally, in case of groups of perfectly correlated variables in the dataset, LASSO
could choose any number of them as it is indifferent with respect to the coefficient
penalization part of its objective function. However, for the sake of interpretabil-
ity, it would be better to include only one among perfectly correlated variables,
possibly the most interpretable. Therefore, a procedure for the elimination of du-
plicated complex variables is implemented. Note that this procedure does not have
an impact on the subsequent classification either.
Step 4: Probability Estimation with Ridge Logistic Regression. Ridge Regression
[27] is a very commonly used method of regularization. This is achieved by pe-
nalizing the sum of the squared regression coefficients in the optimization goal of
the logistic model, forcing the coefficients to take small values.
In this last step, multiple Ridge Logistic Regression models are estimated by
varying the penalty value. Again, 100 different penalization values generated
according to the methodology presented by Friedman et al. [13] are considered.
The model having the best accuracy is then selected to estimate the probability of
falsehood of reports.
4. Computational Experiments
To validate the presented proposal as VeriPol’s predictive model, an empir-
ical evaluation of the goodness of its performance against real tagged reports is
needed. To do so, the dataset illustrated in Section 3.1 is used. This dataset, as pre-
viously described, is comprised of 588 false and 534 true reports, corresponding
to a total of n = 1, 122 cases. This number of documents is enough to overcome
stated algorithmic classification problems due to small datasets [18].
VeriPol estimates the probability of falsehood of a report by using Ridge Lo-
gistic Regression. However, other approaches are possible and equally valid.
Hence, next we present a comparison of regression methodologies, showing that
Ridge Logistic Regression is the best choice. All in all, the following methods are
tested:
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1. Ridge Logistic Regression (RLR), penalizes the sum of the squared regres-
sion coefficients in the optimization goal of the logistic model.
2. Support Vector Machines (SVMs), represent observations as points in space
and finds the hyperplane that separates them in the best possible way. Intu-
itively, a good separation is achieved by the hyperplane that has the largest
distance to the nearest training-data point of any class, since in general the
larger the margin the lower the generalization error of the classifier [59].
SVMs can efficiently perform a non-linear classification using the kernel
trick, implicitly mapping the inputs into high-dimensional feature spaces. In
these experiments, standard parameters are used: radial Kernel; cost = 1;
γ = 1/p = 0.00625; ǫ = 0.1.
3. Random Forest [4], is an ensemble learning method that operates by con-
structing a multitude of decision trees at training time and outputting the
mean prediction (in case of regression) of the individual trees. Decision
trees partition the factor space according to value tests, therefore resulting
in a non-linear classification. In these experiments, standard parameters are
used: number of trees = 500; variables tried at each split = ⌊p/3⌋ = 53,
where p is the number of features selected in Step 3.
4. Naive Bayes, learns the class-conditional probabilities p(xi|y) of each in-
put xi, i = 1, ..., n given the class label y. Classification is made by using
Bayes’ rule to compute the posterior probability of each class y given the
vector of observed attribute values. Naive Bayes assumes the features are
conditionally independent given the category. Despite its simplicity and
the fact that its conditional independence assumption does not hold in real-
world situations, Naive Bayes-based Regression still tends to perform sur-
prisingly well [32]. From the Naive Bayes model the output obtained is the
probability for the false class.
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.9153 (0.8975, 0.931) 0.9269 0.9026 0.9129 0.9198 0.9721
SVM 0.9029 (0.884, 0.9196) 0.9065 0.8989 0.9080 0.9072 0.9694
Random Forests 0.852 (0.8299, 0.8723) 0.8810 0.8202 0.8436 0.8619 0.9244
Naive Bayes 0.8253 (0.8018, 0.8471) 0.9660 0.6704 0.7634 0.8529 0.9135
Table 1: Performance statistics for the models considered: Accuracy (95% Confidence Interval),
Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
The performance of the methods, combined with the feature selection proce-
dure described, has been evaluated using using Leave-One-Out Cross-Validation
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(LOOCV). Table 1 shows some statistics - Accuracy (95% Confidence Interval),
Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC - calculated according to the
following definitions [46]:
• Accuracy, TP + TN/TP + TN + FP + FN
• Sensitivity, TP/TP + FN
• Specificity, TN/TN + FP
• Precision, TP/TP + FP
• F1, 2 ∗ TP/2 ∗ TP + FP + FN
• AUC, Area under the ROC curve, where the ROC curve is created by plot-
ting the true positive rate against the false positive rate at various threshold
settings.
The classification into “false” (corresponding to value 1) or “true” (corre-
sponding to value 0) is obtained by rounding the probabilities estimated by the
regression methods (i.e., threshold equal to 0.5). Therefore:
• TP (True Positive) is the number of false documents correctly classified as
false.
• TN (True Negative) is the number of true documents correctly classified as
true.
• FN (False Negative) is the number of false documents wrongly classified as
true.
• FP (False Positive) is the number of true documents wrongly classified as
false.
Figure 1 shows the ROC for the considered models. By observing the table
and the figure it can be concluded that, overall, RLR has the best performance and
Naive Bayes has the best Sensitivity and Recall. Also, no significant differences
are detected between RLR and SVM in terms of Accuracy (i.e., the confidence
interval overlap). In terms of ROC, RLR and SVM clearly dominate the other
models, while no clear dominance can be established between them. Multiple De-
Long’s test for two correlated ROC curves [9] show that no significant differences
14
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Figure 1: ROC curves for the models considered. (For interpretation of the references to color in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
are detected between the AUC of RLR and SVM (Z = 1.3206, p-value = 0.1866),
while RLR is clearly superior to Naive Bayes (Z = 7.8948, p-value = 2.908e-15)
and Random Forests (Z = 8.2953, p-value < 2.2e-16) in terms of AUC.
In conclusion, all the models perform well, however two groups can be identi-
fied: RLR and SVM showing high performances, and Random Forests and Naive
Bayes presenting slightly worse results. However, RLR has an advantage that sets
it apart from SVM, which is that the resulting estimated model can be interpreted
easily and used to obtain useful insights, as shown in Section 5.
4.1. Comparison with state-of-the-art methods
The methodology used in VeriPol has been applied to several datasets from
the literature where the performance of the presented model has been compared
against the results of state-of-the art approaches. Concretely this paper’s method-
ology has been tested on the following datasets:
Positive Sentiment Hotel Opinions This dataset, first introduced in [43] , and
used in [43, 42, 24] and [5] , is comprised of 400 deceptive and 400 truthful
positive reviews on 20 hotels in the Chicago area. VeriPol’s results against
the aforementioned state-of-the art approaches are shown in Table 2.
Positive and Negative Sentiment Hotel Opinions This dataset is first introduced
in [42] and extends the Positive Sentiment Hotel Opinions dataset, by intro-
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ducing 400 deceptive and 400 truthful negative reviews on 20 hotels in the
Chicago area. Some authors consider the positive and negative dataset sep-
arately [42, 24, 5] (see Table 3), while others jointly [42, 5] (see Table
4).
Abortion Opinions This dataset, introduced and used in [36], presents 100 true
and 100 deceitful opinions on the topic of abortion. VeriPol’s results against
its original methodology are shown in Table 5.
Death Penalty Opinions This dataset, introduced and used in [36], presents 100
true and 100 deceitful opinions on the topic of death penalty. VeriPol’s
results against its original methodology are shown in Table 6.
Best Friend Opinions This dataset, introduced and used in [36], presents 100
true and 100 deceitful opinions on the topic of death penalty. VeriPol’s
results against its original methodology are shown in Table 7.
Extended Hotel, Restaurant, and Doctor Opinions This dataset, first introduced
in [33] , presents 940 true and 940 deceitful opinions on hotels (extending
the Positive and negative Sentiment Hotel Opinions dataset), 520 true and
200 deceitful opinions on restaurants, and 400 true opinions on doctors, ob-
tained from different sources (i.e., Turkers, experts and customers). The
three domains are considered separately in [33] (see Tables 8, 9, 10), and
jointly in [22] (see Table 11).
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.975 (0.9617, 0.9847) 0.9800 0.9700 0.9703 0.9751 0.9955
SVM 0.9688 (0.9542, 0.9797) 0.9750 0.9625 0.9630 0.9689 0.9915
Random Forests 0.8475 (0.8207, 0.8717) 0.8600 0.8350 0.8390 0.8494 0.9326
Naive Bayes 0.8925 (0.8689, 0.9131) 0.8775 0.9075 0.9046 0.8909 0.9414
[43] 0.898 - - - - -
[42] 0.893 - - - - -
[5] - - - - 0.89 -
[24] - - - - 0.902 -
Table 2: Performance statistics of our models on the Positive Sentiment Hotel Opinions dataset:
Accuracy (95% Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
The bottom rows of Tables 2 to 11 illustrate the performance achieved by
methodologies from the literature. Note that only the best result presented in each
paper is reported. It can be easily seen that this paper’s presented methodology
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Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.95 (0.94, 0.97) 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.99
SVM 0.95 (0.94, 0.97) 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Random Forests 0.82 (0.80, 0.85) 0.84 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.91
Naive Bayes 0.87 (0.84, 0.89) 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.91
[42] 0.86 - - - - -
[5] - - - - 0.865 -
[24] - - - - 0.872 -
Table 3: Performance statistics of our models on the Negative Sentiment Hotel Opinions dataset:
Accuracy (95% Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.95 (0.93, 0.96) 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
SVM 0.95 (0.93, 0.96) 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.98
Random Forests 0.85 (0.83, 0.88) 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.93
Naive Bayes 0.88 (0.85, 0.90) 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.94
[42] 0.872 - - - - -
[5] - - - - 0.879 -
Table 4: Performance statistics of our models on the Positive and Negative Sentiment Hotel Opin-
ions dataset: Accuracy (95% Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1,
AUC.
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.80 (0.73, 0.85) 0.87 0.72 0.76 0.81 0.85
SVM 0.76 (0.69, 0.81) 0.82 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.84
Random Forests 0.73 (0.66, 0.79) 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.79
Naive Bayes 0.68 (0.61, 0.74) 0.93 0.42 0.62 0.74 0.83
[36] 0.70 - - - - -
Table 5: Performance statistics of our models on the Abortion Opinions dataset: Accuracy (95%
Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.73 (0.67, 0.80) 0.81 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.61
SVM 0.73 (0.67, 0.80) 0.81 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.81
Random Forests 0.73 (0.66, 0.79) 0.81 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.63
Naive Bayes 0.61 (0.54, 0.68) 0.92 0.30 0.57 0.70 0.62
[36] 0.674 - - - - -
Table 6: Performance statistics of our models on the Death Penalty Opinions dataset: Accuracy
(95% Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
(top rows), specially the Ridge Logistic Regression, outperforms all of them. The
reader is reminded that these results were obtained using LOOCV and that VeriPol
includes filters to remove variables that could introduce overfitting and biases as
introduced in Section 3.2. The improvement of more than 7% in all tested datasets
in different domains against different state-of-the-art methodologies shows the
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Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.90 (0.85, 0.94) 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.97
SVM 0.90 (0.85, 0.94) 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.95
Random Forests 0.78 (0.72, 0.84) 0.74 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.86
Naive Bayes 0.82 (0.76, 0.87) 0.69 0.95 0.93 0.80 0.92
[36] 0.77 - - - - -
Table 7: Performance statistics of our models on the Best Friend Opinions dataset: Accuracy (95%
Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.93 (0.92, 0.94) 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.98
SVM 0.92 (0.89, 0.95) 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.98
Random Forests 0.82 (0.80, 0.84) 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.90
Naive Bayes 0.85 (0.83, 0.87) 0.90 0.80 0.82 0.86 0.91
[33] 0.664 - - - - -
Table 8: Performance statistics of our models on the Extended Hotel Opinions dataset: Accuracy
(95% Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.94 (0.91, 0.96) 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.98
SVM 0.92 (0.89, 0.95) 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.97
Random Forests 0.82 (0.78, 0.86) 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.90
Naive Bayes 0.86 (0.82, 0.89) 0.79 0.93 0.92 0.85 0.91
[33] 0.765 - - - - -
Table 9: Performance statistics of our models on the Restaurant Opinions dataset: Accuracy (95%
Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.98 (0.97, 0.99) 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00
SVM 0.99 (0.98, 1.00) 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
Random Forests 0.94 (0.92, 0.95) 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00
Naive Bayes 0.87 (0.84, 0.89) 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.91
[33] 0.647 - - - - -
Table 10: Performance statistics of our models on the Doctor Opinions dataset: Accuracy (95%
Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall, F1, AUC.
robustness and value of VeriPol.
4.2. Human Experts Validation
To test the efficiency of VeriPol against the manual assessment of falsehood
of each registered report, two officers from the Spanish National Police Corps
analyzed the reports in the corpus. These two experts where given a random
subsample of the corpus comprised of 659 reports and were asked to classify each
report as true or false, and evaluate how certain they were of their answer using
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Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1 AUC
RLR 0.95 (0.94, 0.96) 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.99
SVM 0.95 (0.94, 0.96) 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.99
Random Forests 0.84 (0.82, 0.85) 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.91
Naive Bayer 0.87 (0.85, 0.88) 0.90 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.93
[22] - - - - - 0.907
Table 11: Performance statistics of our models on the Extended Hotel, Restaurant, and Doctor
Opinions dataset: Accuracy (95% Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, Recall,
F1, AUC.
a 5 star-Likert scale. Note that to avoid biases in the experiment, reports were
randomly shuffled, anonymized and untagged before handing them to the agents.
Accuracy (95% CI) Sensitivity Specificity Precision F1
Evaluator 1 0.7596 (0.7248, 0.792) 0.8556 0.6291 0.7583 0.8040
Evaluator 2 0.7255 (0.6895, 0.7594) 0.9683 0.3883 0.6873 0.8039
VeriPol 0.9272 (0.9046, 0.9458) 0.9556 0.8877 0.9219 0.9385
Table 12: Performance comparison between the expert evaluators and VeriPol on a random sub-
sample of 659 reports: Accuracy (95% Confidence Interval), Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision,
Recall, F1.
A comparison of the accuracy of the evaluators versus VeriPol is given in Table
12. The AUC could not be calculated as the human experts classified the reports
as true or false rather than assigning a falsehood probability. For this experiment,
the performance of VeriPol is computed using LOOCV on the same subsample.
In terms of accuracy, the human experts have statistically similar rates (their 95%
CI overlap), while VeriPol significantly outperforms the human experts (the 95%
CI of VeriPol do not overlap with those of the experts) obtaining an improvement
of more than 15% versus Evaluator 1 and of more than 20% versus Evaluator 2.
Interestingly, Evaluator 2 achieves a slightly better Sensitivity and Recall, how-
ever this can be obtained by classifying as “false” most of the reports. Regarding
the level of certainty, Figure 2 shows the number of reports obtaining a certain
rating for each evaluate. From the figure it can be seen that Evaluator 1 is more
confident in his/her answers and, indeed, achieves a better precision.
According to this analysis, VeriPol is capable of detecting hidden patterns that
are not evident to the “human eye,” even to that of an expert.
4.3. False Robbery Reports Detection Model
Table 13 presents, for each variable, the coefficients of the false report detec-
tion model (translated from Spanish). For a list of the variables included, please
refer to Section 3.2. Variables preceded by a hash character (#) correspond to
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Figure 2: Evaluators certainty ratings. Evaluator 1 is represented with a continuous line while
Evaluator 2 is represented with a dashed line.
PoS tags (see Table A.16 for the full list of PoS tags and their description), those
preceded by a star character (*) are document statistics (e.g., number of tokens,
lemmata, and sentences within a document), and the rest are unigram lemmata.
To simplify the presentation, variables are grouped according to the effect on the
classification and to the corresponding type (i.e., binary, frequency, logarithm, and
ratio, see Section 3.2), as variables of different types are not comparable. This is
due to the differences in magnitude: binary variables take values 0 or 1; frequency
variables can take any positive natural number; logarithm variables are real values
on a logarithmic scale; ratio variables are real values between 0 and 1 and, in the
dataset considered, they typically take very small values.
The coefficients to the variables can be interpreted to understand their impor-
tance when it comes to detect false reports. This, in turn, allows to identify dif-
ferences between real and false reports, patterns of behavior, and shed some light
on how people lie to the police. VeriPol computes the probability of falsehood of
a report, i.e., predicted values close to 1 indicate that the report has a high prob-
ability of being false, and viceversa. Therefore positive coefficients correspond
to variables that increase the probability of falsehood, while negative coefficients
correspond to variables that decrease this probability. Also, the higher the absolute
value, the stronger this effect is. For example, the binary variable associated with
the unigram “day” has an associated coefficient equal to 0.4825, meaning that the
appearance of the word “day” in a document slightly increases its probability of
falsehood.
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Falsehood Variables Truth Variables
Binary Variable Frequency
Variable
Logarithm
Variable
Ratio Variable Binary Variable Frequency
Variable
Logarithm
Variable
Ratio Variable
day (0.4825) two hundred
(0.2996)
to pull out
(0.3940)
responsible
(32.6211)
bus (−0.5166) grand
(−0.3657)
officer
(−0.3786)
even
(−72.3152)
lawyer (0.4307) #CSUBF
(0.1910)
shove (0.2534) disregard
(29.9065)
to kill
(−0.4897)
plate
(−0.1898)
taken
(−0.2527)
to escape
(−68.6025)
to report
(0.4300)
felony (0.1677) insurance
(0.2433)
separate
(28.6956)
to drag
(−0.4837)
around
(−0.1864)
to pass
(−0.2429)
Chinese
(−52.5844)
to extract
(0.4155)
hand bag
(0.1275)
back (0.1442) #NEG
(28.6044)
pendant
(−0.3778)
taken
(−0.1617)
final (−0.2422) doubt
(−50.2013)
to start (0.3684) cash (0.1166) helmet
(26.9261)
Chinese
(−0.3666)
light (−0.1506) police
(−0.1664)
turning up
(−48.1339)
to react
(0.3120)
list (0.1129) iphone
(25.5605)
landing
(−0.3639)
police
(−0.0972)
again
(−0.1522)
pay attention to
(−47.6469)
policy (0.2389) backpack
(0.1070)
to report
(20.7153)
assault
(−0.3517)
#VCLIger
(−0.0824)
#VSinf
(−0.1493)
to shout
(−40.6734)
apple (0.2352) unique
(20.6342)
beard
(−0.3425)
friend
(−0.0612)
face (−0.1450) authorised
(−34.6212)
company
(0.2195)
contract
(19.1924)
report
(−0.3413)
aforementioned
(−0.0546)
short
(−0.1434)
to tend
(−32.1409)
only (0.2021) cash (19.1827) mountain
(−0.3215)
male
(−0.0250)
#PAL
(−0.1351)
climb
(−31.3857)
insurance
(0.1918)
shoulder
(17.9951)
officer
(−0.3093)
#PPC
(−0.0110)
friend
(−0.1327)
car (−28.1087)
establishment
(0.1853)
removal
(17.6851)
wrestle
(−0.2820)
age (−0.1157) doctor
(−16.7533)
to contain
(0.1741)
series
(16.8249)
would recognise
(−0.2722)
#VCLIinf
(−0.1079)
neck
(−16.6258)
model (0.1274) urban
(16.5677)
entrance hall
(−0.2617)
theft
(−16.1871)
back (0.1198) model
(14.4221)
neighbour
(−0.2614)
chain
(−16.0589)
behind (0.1172) next (13.5029) turning up
(−0.2404)
#PPX
(−15.1829)
number
(0.1148)
specifically
(13.0455)
to start
(−0.2283)
#DM
(−7.8174)
black (0.1035) to detail
(12.5800)
four (−0.1957) #ART
(−4.1312)
list (10.0908) several
(−0.1696)
right (9.4583) attach
(−0.1628)
back (7.7415) record
(−0.1627)
mobile phone
(7.5446)
neck
(−0.1600)
to carry
(7.4077)
make known
(−0.1362)
object (7.2053) to grab
(−0.1275)
*Document Sen-
tences (6.8603)
short
(−0.1251)
euro (6.8160) hair (−0.1043)
#NC (1.6161) brunette/dark-
skinned
(−0.1007)
*Document Con-
cepts (1.1135)
to recognise
(−0.1002)
thin (−0.0945)
centimeter
(−0.0941)
constitution
(−0.0907)
Table 13: Model variables and corresponding coefficients. Translated from Spanish. Variables
preceded by a hash character (#) correspond to PoS tags (see Table A.16 for the full list of PoS
tags and their description), those preceded by a star character (*) are document statistics (e.g.,
number of tokens, lemmata, and sentences within a document), and the rest are unigram lemmata.
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In the following, the variables chosen by VeriPol, their corresponding coeffi-
cients and their interpretation are given.
The intercept of the RLR model is 0.1513, therefore initially all the reports
are considered presumably true. According to VeriPol, reports that present the
words “day,” “lawyer,” “to report” and “to extract” are more likely false, while the
words “bus,” “to kill,” “to drag” and ”pendant“ characterize true reports. Further-
more, a high appearance of the words “two hundred,” “felony,” “hand bag” and
of subordinate conjunctions that introduce finite clauses (corresponding to vari-
able CSUBF, e.g., “barely”) is typical in false reports, whereas a high frequency
of the words “Grand” (appearing in the corpus as part of the sentence “Samsung
Galaxy Grand”), “plate” (appearing in the corpus with the meaning “vehicle reg-
istration plate”), “around,” and “taken” (appearing in the corpus with the meaning
“stolen”) indicates that the report is probably true. Additionally, high magnitudes
of the words “to pull out,” “shove,” “insurance,” and “back” (appearing in the
corpus as a the body part) indicate that the report is false, while high magnitudes
of the words “officer” (appearing in the corpus with the meaning “Police offi-
cer”), again “taken,” “to pass,” and “final” indicate that the report is true. Finally,
high ratios in the document of the words “responsible,” “disregard” (appearing
in the corpus as part of the sentence “disregard of its truthfulness”), “separate,”
and negations (variable NEG) are typical in false reports, whereas high ratios of
“even,” “to escape,” “Chinese,” and “doubt” (appearing in the corpus as part of
the sentence “without any doubt,” thus taking the opposite meaning).
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Figure 3: Histogram of VeriPol’s predicted probabilities.
As mentioned, VeriPol estimates a probability of falsehood. The histogram
of the probabilities predicted by VeriPol relative to the reports in the dataset is
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0 1
0 482 43
1 52 545
Table 14: Confusion matrix of VeriPol. Columns correspond to the reference (i.e., the real docu-
ment label) while the rows correspond to the prediction.
presented in Figure 3. It can be appreciated the U-shape indicating that most
values are close to either 0 or 1, rather than 0.5, suggesting that VeriPol provides
a definitive answer most of the time. When using VeriPol as a classifier (with a
threshold equal to 0.5) the accuracy (computed using LOOCV) is 0.9153 and the
corresponding confusion matrix can be observed in Table 14. In the application
context considered, the most sensible type of error is the error of the first kind, that
correspond to false positives, i.e., true reports that are classified as false. The ratio
of false positive for VeriPol is 0.0954. Figure 4 shows the probability histogram
for the false positive cases. It can be clearly seen that the highest percentage of
cases have a probability close to 0.5, that is, the answer provided by VeriPol is
rather uncertain. For this reason, it is recommended that the predicted probability
is interpreted by agents that can adjust the classification threshold according to
their experience. Also, the predicted probability could be used as a ranking factor
among the reports to assign priority to cases, rather than for proper classification,
since there exists an obvious trade-off between accuracy and false-positive rate.
Figure 4: Histogram of VeriPol’s predicted probabilities for false positive documents.
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5. Discussion: Model Analysis
From the analysis of VeriPol’s features and coefficients it is possible to draw
interesting insights on how people lie to the police. In fact, the model is capable
of discerning significant differences in the narrative of true and false reports that
lead to the best separation between these two classes. Reviewing all the concepts
included in VeriPol and the situations where they appear in the corpus allows to
understand and extract the characteristics identified by the model. From this anal-
ysis it surfaced that true and false reports mostly differ in three main aspects: i)
modus operandi of the aggression, ii) morphosyntax of the report and iii) amount
of details. Note that the concrete variables used to guide the following insights
are highlighted in the explanation with quotation marks.
5.1. Modus Operandi
With respect to the modus operandi of the aggression described in the report
it can be found that reports that describe the following type of felonies have lower
probabilities of falsehood: i) Theft of necklaces (mostly jewelry or gold chains)
represented in the reports by: “neck,” “chain,” or “pendant.” ii) Crimes that in-
volve “mountain” bikes, either as the object stolen or as the mean of transportation
of the aggressor. iii) Aggressions close to the home of the victim, near the “en-
trance hall” or in the “landing” of the stairs.
On the other hand, those that describe the following type of felonies have a
higher probability of falsehood: i) Pulls or “shoves” from “behind” of the victim’s
“backpack,” “hand bag,” or of items hanging from the victim’s “shoulder.” In
general, any aggressions coming from the “back.” ii) Attacks by someone that
is wearing a motorcycle “helmet.” iii) Robberies of expensive “mobile phones,”
making special stress on the brands “iPhone,” “Apple,” Samsung Galaxy “Grand.”
Other concepts identified by VeriPol that belong to this group are “model” (of the
phone), “series” (of the phone), phone “company,” or the type of phone “contract.”
5.2. Morphosyntax
When looking at the morphosyntactic characteristics of reports, it is observed
that truthful reports tend to have the following peculiarities: i) High frequency
of clitic gerund verbs (variable VCLIger), clitic infinitive verbs (variable VCLI-
inf), Clitics and personal pronouns (variable PPX) and Clitic personal pronouns
(variable PPC). ii) High frequency of Demonstrative pronouns (variable DM) and
Articles (variable ART). iii) Very high occurrences of the verb “to be” in infinitive
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(variable VSinf) and the portmanteau word, “to”(variable PAL). The high occur-
rence in truthful reports of both clitic verbs and nouns (and also of the verb “to
be”) represents a high presence of descriptions of interactions between actors in
a narrative. More importantly it describes reflexive actions happening both to the
victim or the aggressor. This fact highly contrasts with the description of false
reports shown next, where common and not reflexive nouns and verbs are pre-
dominant. This means that truthful reports are more centered in the story telling
of the dynamic of the felony and the interactions of both the victim and the ag-
gressor where clitic verbs and nouns represent that the action falls on the subject
of the sentence. It is a closer and more personal way of narrating the incident.
Also, the high frequency of demonstrative pronouns, articles or the word “to” in
comparison with the absence thereof in false reports reflects that truthful reports
tend to be richer in descriptions.
On the contrary, false reports tend to present the following syntactic charac-
teristics. i) High frequency of subordinating conjunctions that introduce finite
clauses (variable CSUBF, i.e. “barely”). This characteristic reflects that false
reports tend to present sentences that reflect lack of information being “barely”
most of the times part of sentences in the line of “s/he could barely see” or “s/he
barely remembers.” Similarly, false reports also present high ratios of negations
(variable NEG) in comparison with the length of the document. Examples of sen-
tences found with this characteristic are: “s/he cannot report more data,” “s/he has
not suffered injuries,” “s/he could not see,” “s/he could not recognize” or “s/he
did not attend a medical facility.” Interestingly, as shown next, these very same
sentences but in positive are very representative of truthful reports. ii) High per-
centage of the variable Document Sentences, which is the inverse of the average
length of sentences. Meaning that false reports seem to be characterized by shorter
sentences. iii) Finally, and contrarily to truthful reports that seem to be delineated
by reflexive nouns and verbs indicating that the action is being focused on the
actor of the sentences, high ratios of common nouns (variable NC) are identified
as properties of false reports. While truthful reports are characterized by high fre-
quency of reflexive verbs and nouns reflecting a personal description of actions
happening to the victim, false reports are delineated by enumerations of common
nouns, focusing more on objects rather than the dynamic of the felony. This is also
confirmed by a higher ratio of Document Concepts in false reports, that is unique
concepts, meaning that false reports are more similar to lists of enumerated facts
or objects than true reports, that focus more on the description of a limited number
of concepts.
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5.3. Amount of details
With respect to the amount and type of information provided, truthful reports
tend to have the following peculiarities. i) Longer documents that provide more
details about the robbery and the aggressor. This conclusion can be drawn from
the coefficients associated to variables representing the ratios and frequencies of
“even,” “(without) doubt” (note in the case of truthful reports doubt is always ac-
companied by without) and “aforementioned.” Also, from the appearance of the
words “would recognize” or “to recognize,” “pay attention to” (a detail), meaning
that the victim is able to recognize the attacker. Finally, from the presence of char-
acteristics describing a person or the attack with words like “face,” “beard,” “hair,”
“centimeter,” “brunette/dark-skinned,” “thin,” “constitution,” “short,” “light,” the
high presence of “age,” “male,” or vehicle “plate.” ii) Similarly, verbs indicating
interaction between the attacker and the victim are signs of truthful reports: “to
shout,” “to wrestle,” “to grab,” “to start to.” Again, this goes along with the previ-
ous conclusion that the more information and details, the lower the probability of
falsehood. iii) Finally, it seems that having interacted during or after the incident
with other people or being able to justify or provide extra information are also
good signs to identify truthful reports. Such as: a) When the victim includes or
reports extra information with words like “attach,” “ to make known” (appearing
in the corpus as part of the sentence “wishes to place on record”). b) When the
victim informs that s/he received medical care after the felony. The words that
represent this situation are “doctor,” medical “report,” “authorised” (appearing in
the corpus indicating a document signed by an authorized/empowered person),
“to tend” (appearing in the corpus with the meaning “to be tended”). c) When the
victim has reported the presence of witnesses like a “friend” or a “neighbour.” d)
When there is a high frequency of the words “police,” “officer” or “turning up”
(referred in the corpus to an officer). This represents that the victim has looked
for or contacted security forces right after the aggression.
On the other hand, giving vague information about the attack is distinctive of
false reports. Some of the words that represent this situation are “back,” “behind,”
“helmet,” referring to the situations where the victim could not see the attacker.
Also, references to “black” clothes are more likely in false reports. The word
“only” denotes vague descriptions as it usually appears in sentences like “only
being able to” or “only having seen.” Other words suggest a high interest of the
victim in claiming money to insurance companies, denoting the intention of the
complainant in filing a false robbery report to commit a fraud: “policy,” “insur-
ance,” “iPhone,” “Apple,” “Grand,” “mobile phone,” “ model,” “series,” “euro,”
“cash,” “two hundred,” “company,” “contract” (with a mobile company). Finally,
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Figure 5: Histogram of the length of the reports. True reports are represented in blue and false
reports are depicted in red. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
the ratio of “disregard” is a characteristic of false reports. The word “disregard”
appears in all the reports as part of a standard sentence that explains the legal con-
sequences of giving a statement in “disregard of the truth.” Therefore, its ratio
is a proxy to the inverse length of the text. This means that shorter documents
are more likely to be false. This is confirmed by Figure 5 that shows in blue and
red the histograms of the number of words in true and false reports, respectively.
The data proves that true reports contain more words and false reports tend to be
shorter.
6. Pilot Study
As explained, VeriPol has been designed in collaboration with the Spanish
National Police that provided the report corpus and the resources to run a pilot
study.
To test the efficacy and effectiveness of VeriPol, a pilot study has been under-
taken in the urban areas of Murcia and Ma´laga, Spain. More in detail, the pilot
study was run in Murcia (four police departments involved) from the 5th to the
9th of June 2017, while it took place in Ma´laga (six police departments involved)
from the 12th to the 16th of June 2017. In each destination, two expert officers
in false report detection and in VeriPol were sent to install the software, give a
short course on its use to the local agents and investigators, and supervise all the
activity. After that, all the new robbery reports and all the open robbery cases of
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2017 were evaluated by VeriPol.
The results of the pilot study are shown in Table 15. As it can be observed,
the implementation of VeriPol allowed for an impressive increase in productivity
in terms of number of false cases of robbery detected and successfully closed. In
fact, in just one week, 25 and 39 false robbery reports were detected and closed
while the average number of false robbery cases detected and closed in the months
of June 2008-2016 is 3.33 and 12.14, in Murcia and Ma´laga respectively. More
importantly, the success ratios (i.e., the number of false robbery cases closed di-
vided by the number of complainants interrogated) are 81.58% in Murcia and
84.78% in Ma´laga. It is important to notice that a robbery case is successfully
closed as false only if the complainant confesses his/her crime. Therefore, these
ratios are necessarily lower than or equal to the real precision of VeriPol during the
pilot study, as potentially, not all the guilty complainants might have confessed.
As a consequence, the results of the pilot study allow to estimate a lower bound
on the real precision. In particular, VeriPol correctly evaluated at least 83.54% of
the reports classified as false.
Destination # cases closed pilot study Avg # cases closed June Ratio
Murcia 31 3.33 81.58%
Ma´laga 49 12.14 84.78%
Total 80 15.47 83.54%
Table 15: Results of the pilot study: urban area of destination, number of false violent robbery
cases closed during the pilot study, average number of false violent robbery cases closed in the
month of June 2008-2016, and ratio of false violent robbery cases closed and suspects interrogated
after VeriPol analyzed the report and assigned it a high probability of falsehood.
Also, to understand the level of acceptance associated with the use of VeriPol,
all the agents and officials that participated in the pilot study were asked to answer
to an anonymous questionnaire on a voluntary basis that addressed their level of
satisfaction with VeriPol and the perceived usefulness. Overall, the 21 participants
agreed that VeriPol is useful, easy to use, and that it should be extended to other
types of crime.
Given the successful outcome of the pilot study, VeriPol is currently being
installed in the report-managing software of the SNP as a decision support tool.
It is important to remark that all the decisions regarding how to proceed with the
investigation based on the probability estimated by VeriPol are left to the officers
and are their responsibility.
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7. Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper a text-based lie detection model for police reports is presented.
The model consists of a multi-step methodology that combines NLP and ML tech-
niques including among others feature selection by L1 penalization and heuristic
rules. Our findings, obtained by analyzing the structure of the designed model,
VeriPol, are reliable as it presents a very low misclassification error, lower than
9%, while expert policemen showed an error of 25%, approx. Also, the model
improves the accuracy of several models from the literature in various domains.
A pilot study allowed to verify the performance of VeriPol on the field, proving
its usefulness by allowing to solve a very high number of false robbery cases. In
particular, a lower bound on the empirical precision of VeriPol during the pilot
study was 83%, approx.
VeriPol’s analysis makes possible to identify a clear pattern. Truthful reports
usually present more details, personal information and descriptions. On the other
hand, false reports are mostly characterized by being shorter and more focused
on the stolen property rather than the aggression and by the impossibility of pro-
viding precise information about the incident, recognize the attacker, producing
witnesses, or other hard evidence (e.g., contacting a police officer right after the
aggression or a doctor).
The findings provided by VeriPol coincide with those in other researches in
the domain of fake online reviews. Ott et al. [43] reported that truthful opinions
tend to include more sensorial and concrete language than deceptive opinions; in
particular, truthful opinions are more specific about spatial configurations. Vrij et
al. [55] concluded that liars have considerable difficultly encoding spatial infor-
mation into their lies which seems to relate to our conclusion that truthful reports
include more details and descriptions than false reports. Regarding Newman et
al. [40] analysis about categories and type of words in false stories, it is impossi-
ble to compare our linguistic analysis to theirs (count of present tense, past tense,
pronouns, etc) for two main reasons: i) police reports are written by an officer
reflecting the description of the event of a victim while the study by Newman et
al. concerns self written deceptive texts and ii) the presence of adjectives, nouns,
pronouns, etcetera, depends on the topic. However, these findings suggest that,
regardless of the domain, untruthful texts could be identified by lower cognitive
complexity, fewer self-references, more words and more negative words. Future
research on this topic should investigate the degree of veracity of this statement.
Looking at the practical implications of this research, to the Spanish National
Police VeriPol represents an advancement in terms of methodology, as well as a
29
complete change of paradigm in the way that investigations are carried out. More
specifically, the practical contribution of VeriPol is three-fold: i) The existence
of this decision support system, if properly advertised, can help in discouraging
citizens from filing a false report, hence preventing a crime; ii) it improves the
use of limited police resources by supporting investigations; iii) it results in a
reduction of the noise due to false reports in police databases by helping clearing
false robbery cases.
In addition, this system opens the door to a new form of investigation that is
individualized in the robbery crimes due its special incidence and social repercus-
sion and with the possibility of extending it to any type of police investigation as
we believe that this is the beginning of a unusual and innovative model.
Finally, the implementation of VeriPol makes the Spanish National Police the
first in the world to use a decision support system of this type. In fact, there is no
other system with similar characteristics, neither at academic nor at practitioner
level, and research on detecting lies from text is still in its infancy. Similar ini-
tiatives in foreign police have had a very strong media impact. For example, the
PredPol tool developed between the California Santa Cruz Police and the Univer-
sity of California Los Angeles has been named by TimeMagazine as one of the 50
Best Inventions of 2011 [16]. The implementation of the model proposed in this
investigation puts the National Police in the forefront as one of the most advanced
police in the world, with a very positive impact for its image, both nationally and
internationally.
As future work we intend to extend the model and train it in different types of
reports to expand its applicability. There is of course much to be done in crime
forecasting. However, we hope that this work will be a useful source of ideas
for future research and other police agencies, helping reduce crime and increase
police effectiveness3.
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Appendix A.
Tag Description Tag Description
ACRNM acronym (ISO, CEI) PPX Clitics and personal pronouns (nos, me, nosotras, te, sı´)
ADJ Adjectives (mayores, mayor) PREP Negative preposition (sin)
ADV Adverbs (muy, demasiado, co´mo) PREP Preposition
ALFP Plural letter of the alphabet (As/Aes, bes) PREP/DEL Complex preposition “despue´s del”
ALFS Singular letter of the alphabet (A, b) QU Quantifiers (sendas, cada)
ART Articles (un, las, la, unas) REL Relative pronouns (cuyas, cuyo)
CARD Cardinals SE Se (as particle)
CC Coordinating conjunction (y, o) SYM Symbols
CCAD Adversative coordinating conjunction (pero) UMMX measure unit (MHz, km, mA)
CCNEG Negative coordinating conjunction (ni) VCLIger clitic gerund verb
CODE Alphanumeric code VCLIinf clitic infinitive verb
CQUE que (as conjunction) VCLIfin clitic finite verb
CSUBF Subordinating conjunction that introduces finite clauses (apenas) VEadj Verb estar. Past participle
CSUBI Subordinating conjunction that introduces infinite clauses (al) VEfin Verb estar. Finite
CSUBX Subordinating conjunction underspecified for subord-type (aunque) VEger Verb estar. Gerund
DM Demonstrative pronouns (e´sas, e´se, esta) VEinf Verb estar. Infinitive
FO Formula VHadj Verb haber. Past participle
FS Full stop punctuation marks VHfin Verb haber. Finite
INT Interrogative pronouns (quie´nes, cua´ntas, cua´nto) VHger Verb haber. Gerund
ITJN Interjection (oh, ja) VHinf Verb haber. Infinitive
NC Common nouns (mesas, mesa, libro, ordenador) VLadj Lexical verb. Past participle
NEG Negation VLfin Lexical verb. Finite
NMEA measure noun (metros, litros) VLger Lexical verb. Gerund
NMON month name VLinf Lexical verb. Infinitive
NP Proper nouns VMadj Modal verb. Past participle
ORD Ordinals (primer, primeras, primera) VMfin Modal verb. Finite
PAL Portmanteau word formed by a and el VMger Modal verb. Gerund
PDEL Portmanteau word formed by de and el VMinf Modal verb. Infinitive
PE Foreign word VSadj Verb ser. Past participle
PNC Unclassified word VSfin Verb ser. Finite
PPC Clitic personal pronoun (le, les) VSger Verb ser. Gerund
PPO Possessive pronouns (mi, su, sus) VSinf Verb ser. Infinitive
Table A.16: PoS tags and their description
(Source: http://www.cis.uni-muenchen.de/ schmid/tools/TreeTagger/data/spanish-tagset.txt).
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